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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
Daniel C. Kniffen**
and Katherine D. Dixon***
I.

LEGISLATION

There was minimal legislation during the 2006 term of the Georgia
General Assembly that impacted workers' compensation. In fact, most
of the legislative changes could be characterized as general housekeeping
measures. For example, Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
section 34-9-1041 was changed to make its wording consistent with that
found in other sections of the Workers' Compensation Act.2 The
mandate that the employee shall receive notice from the employer was
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1. Id. at 195-96, 622 S.E.2d at 869-70. The superior court may only affirm or reverse
as a matter of law, and it may sometimes give directions. Id. at 196, 622 S.E.2d at 869.
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105(c) provides for the limited circumstances when the superior
court may set aside the board's decision:
(1) The [board] members acted without or in excess of their powers; (2) The
decision was procured by fraud; (3) The facts found by the [board] members do not
support the decision; (4) There is not sufficient competent evidence in the record
to warrant the [board] members making the decision; or (5) The decision is
contrary to law.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(c) (2004). In Atkinson v. Home Indemnity Co., the court of appeals
held that the superior court may not substitute itself as a fact-finding authority in lieu of
the board. 141 Ga. App. 687, 687, 234 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1977).
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -389 (2004 & Supp. 2006).
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changed to provide that the employer shall send notice to the employee.'
The time limit for submitting mileage expenses was clarified as running
one year from the date that the mileage was incurred. 4 Also, the total
compensation payable to a surviving spouse as a sole dependent at the
time of death was increased from $125,000 to $150,000.3
Probably the most significant amendment impacting workers'
compensation was actually not an amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act. Instead, the amendment was to the Patient Self-Referral
Act.6 The legislature enacted the Patient Self-Referral Act in 1993
based upon the premise that the "referral of a patient by a health care
provider to a provider of designated health care services in which the
health care provider has an investment interest represents a potential
conflict of interest."7 Georgia's Patient Self-Referral Act was generally
modeled after the federal law commonly referred to as the Stark Act. 8
The Patient Self-Referral Act prohibits referral arrangements,
including the obvious ownership interest and even profit-sharing
arrangements where any consideration is paid for the referral.9 There
also are a number of specific exceptions to the patient referral prohibition. Until this year, one of those exceptions was for physicians treating
workers' compensation patients."0 That exception was deleted in its
entirety by the 2006 General Assembly," thereby making the Patient
Self-Referral Act applicable even in the context of workers' compensation.
II.

A.

RECENT CASES

The Exclusive Remedy Doctrine

The exclusive remedy doctrine provides that an employee who suffers
an injury that arises out of and in the course of employment is barred
from seeking any remedy against his employer outside the parameters
of the Workers' Compensation Act. 12 This doctrine remains a corner-

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Ga. H.B. 1240, § 2, Reg. Sess. (2006).
Id.§3.
Id.§4.
O.C.G.A. §§ 43-1B-1 to -8 (2005 & Supp. 2006).
O.C.G.A. § 43-1B-2 (2005).
42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
O.C.G.A. § 43-1B-4(1) (2005).
O.C.G.A. § 43-1B-7 (2005).
O.C.G.A. § 42-1B-7 (Supp. 2006).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (2004).
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stone of the workers' compensation system, and Georgia's appellate
courts continue to uphold it.
As a fundamental threshold requirement for the application of the
exclusive remedy provision, an employer-employee relationship must
exist. 13 In Chapman v. C.C. Dickson Co.,14 on the day the employee's
employment was terminated, the employee, Chapman, received
permission to use the company's truck to take home personal belongings.
However, before Chapman left, he fell and was injured. Chapman
brought suit, alleging that the company was negligent, and the company
moved for summary judgment on grounds that (1) the Workers'
Compensation Act was Chapman's exclusive remedy because he was still
an employee when he fell and (2) the company was not negligent because
it did not have any notice of the dangerous condition that caused
Chapman's fall. The trial court granted the company's motion and
Chapman appealed. 5 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment on the ground that there was no
evidence that the company was negligent."
Because there was no
evidence that the company was negligent, the court of appeals did not
reach the question of whether Chapman was still an employee at the
time he fell.' 7
However, in Lambert v. Briggs & Stratton Corp.,"s the court addressed the specific extension of the exclusive remedy provision to
businesses utilizing the services of certain "temporary help contracting
firms" for employee leasing arrangements. 9 The plaintiff in that case
was a Talent Tree Staffing employee who was contracted out to Briggs
& Stratton at the time she was injured at the defendant's manufacturing
facility.2" The court rejected the argument that there must be evidence
that the defendant exercised direct supervision over the plaintiff at the
time of her injuries." Instead, the court found that the mere presence
of a leased employee or temporary employee situation, coupled with
satisfaction of the other jurisdictional requirements for workers'
compensation coverage, was sufficient to extend the exclusive remedy
provision to all parties involved.22

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Glover v. Ware, 276 Ga. App. 759, 624 S.E.2d 285 (2005).
273 Ga. App. 640, 616 S.E.2d 478 (2005).
Id. at 640-41, 616 S.E.2d at 478-79.
Id. at 642, 616 S.E.2d at 479.
Id.
No. CV604-016, 2006 WL 156875 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2006).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Similarly, in Apperson v. Southern States Cooperative," an employer
deducted premiums for the purpose of providing workers' compensation
coverage to an independent contractor. After the independent contractor
was injured on the job, he applied for and received workers' compensation benefits and later brought an action against the employer sounding
in tort.24 The court stated that it is well-settled law that "when an
employer of an independent contractor provides workers' compensation
insurance to [the independent contractor], the independent contractor is
2
estopped from denying coverage and seeking damages in tort." 1
Accordingly, the court granted the defendant-employer's motion for
summary judgment. 6
In Theesfeld v. Image Electrolysis & Skin Care, Inc. ,27 the plaintiff in
a tort action alleged that she was an independent contractor at the time
that she was injured. In response, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending that the plaintiff had not only filed a
claim for workers' compensation benefits, but also that the claim had
been settled. Therefore, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's suit
was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.
The trial court granted summary judgment on this
ground.2" On appeal, the court stated that when compensation is paid
pursuant to a settlement of a workers' compensation claim, any
subsequent tort suit by the injured party is barred by the exclusive
remedy provision. 29 However, in this case, there was no evidence in the
record that compensation was paid pursuant to a settlement agreement
approved by the Georgia Workers' Compensation Board (the "board"). °
Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary
judgment on other grounds.3 '
There are exceptions to the exclusive remedy doctrine, but they are not
always viable as a way to hold the employer vicariously liable. In Crisp
Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Oliver, 2 an employee, Oliver, sustained a
back injury while working as a custodian for Crisp Regional Hospital.
The hospital provided medical care benefits for the injury by sending
him to its own medical clinic for treatment. Oliver sued the hospital in

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

No. 6:04-CV-20(WLS), 2005 WL 2290200 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 16, 2005).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
274 Ga. App. 38, 619 S.E.2d 303 (2005).
Id. at 38-39, 619 S.E.2d at 304.
Id. at 39, 619 S.E.2d at 304-05.
Id., 619 S.E.2d at 305.
Id. at 40, 619 S.E.2d at 305.
275 Ga.App. 578, 621 S.E.2d 554 (2005).
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tort, alleging vicarious liability for the negligence of its employees in
providing treatment. The hospital raised the exclusive remedy statute
as a bar to the tort claim.33 The trial court ruled that while the
exclusive remedy provision would bar the claim based upon the alleged
negligence of nonprofessional administrative employees, it would not bar
the claims based upon the alleged negligence of professional employees,
such as physicians and nurses.3 4 The court of appeals reversed, holding
that there is no exception to the exclusive remedy provision for alleged
professional negligence.35 The court noted that the exclusive remedy
provision does not bar an action against an individual physician for
professional negligence when the physician is a co-employee of the
injured employee.3 6 However, there is no basis for a tort action seeking
to impose vicarious liability for the negligence of the employer of both
the injured claimant and the professional co-employee.37
It has long been the law that an employee injured at work by the
intentional tort of a co-employee may assert a common law cause of
action for damages against the co-employee where there is no remedy for
the conduct provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. 38 This is
particularly true where there are allegations of sexual harassment.
While sexual harassment by a coworker may occur in the course of
employment, the conduct is almost always for purely personal reasons
unrelated to the furtherance of the employer's business. Thus, it
typically does not arise out of employment, which means that is not
covered under the Workers' Compensation Act.39
In Travis Pruitt & Associates, P.C. v. Hooper, ° the employee alleged
that she was a victim of a co-employee's sexual harassment and filed
suit against the employer, alleging that it was liable under principles of
respondeat superior and ratification.4'
The trial court denied the
employer's motion for summary judgment.42 On appeal, the court
reversed the trial court's judgment.43 The reversal was based in part

33. Id. at 578-79, 621 S.E.2d at 556; see O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.
34. Crisp, 275 Ga. App. at 579, 621 S.E.2d at 556.
35. Id. at 580-82, 621 S.E.2d at 557-58.
36. Id. at 581, 621 S.E.2d at 558.
37. Id. (citing Davis v. Stover, 258 Ga. 156, 366 S.E.2d 670 (1988)).
38. See Potts v. UAP-GA. AG. Chem., Inc., 270 Ga. 14, 16-17, 506 S.E.2d 101, 103
(1988) (discussing intentional torts as related to workers' compensation liability).
39. Murphy v. ARA Servs., Inc., 164 Ga. App. 859, 861-63, 298 S.E.2d 528, 530-32
(1982).
40. 277 Ga. App. 1, 625 S.E.2d 445 (2005).
41. Id. at 1, 625 S.E.2d at 447.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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upon the observation that the same facts that established that the
employee had a common law cause of action also established that the
employer could not be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior for
the alleged tortious conduct of the plaintiff's co-employee."
B.

Aggravation of Pre-existing Condition

In Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Cross,45 the appellate court held that
aggravation of the employee's "'work-related arthritic condition,"'
stemming from a 1995 occupational exposure to sulfuric acid, was
compensable. 4' The board found that the employee's last day of work
on January 4, 2002 amounted to a "'new injury."'4 7 The employee,
Cross, had been exposed to sulfuric acid on August 22, 1995, and he
suffered effects from it until 2002, missing some time from work in 1995
and again in 2000 and 2001. Cross's doctor diagnosed him with an
autoimmune disorder, which the doctor concluded was caused by Cross's
exposure to sulfuric acid in 1995. Cross stopped work on January 4,
2002, and on January 28, 2002, he filed a workers' compensation claim
against his employer, Georgia Pacific.48 Georgia Pacific contended,
inter alia, that Cross's claim for an "occupational injury" was barred by
the one-year statute of limitations because his injury arose in 1995. 49
The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") agreed with Georgia Pacific, but
the board's appellate division reversed, finding that his continued work
aggravated his condition.50 The court of appeals affirmed the appellate
division's decision.5'
C.

Employer/Employee Relationship

The case of Glover v. Ware deals with the fundamental element in
every workers' compensation case-the employer-employee relationship. In Glover the estate of Willie Fred Glover filed suit in Gwinnett
County State Court against Charles Ware, a landscaper, and his
business entity, Old BW Landscaping, Inc., for wrongful death after
Glover fell off a flatbed truck and was crushed to death by a mulching
machine. The defendants argued that Glover was an employee of Old

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 3, 625 S.E.2d at 448.
275 Ga. App. 664, 621 S.E.2d 586 (2005).
Id. at 664-65, 621 S.E.2d at 587-88.
Id. at 664, 621 S.E.2d at 587.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 665-66, 621 S.E.2d at 588.
276 Ga. App. at 759-62, 624 S.E.2d at 285-88.
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BW Landscaping, and the trial court agreed, granting summary
judgment for the defendants based on the exclusive remedy provisions
of the Workers' Compensation Act.59
The estate appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the summary
judgment, stating that the facts were sufficiently in dispute to prevent
summary judgment.5 4 The facts showed that Glover lived in a trailer
on Ware's farm, and Glover received Social Security disability payments,
which were paid to Ware on Glover's behalf. Ware took care of all of
Glover's needs, including food, shelter, clothing, and spending money,
which exceeded the amount Glover received from Social Security.55
On the date of the accident, Glover went to the job site with Ware, and
Ware testified that Glover did not go there as an employee. When a
crew member failed to show up, Ware asked Glover to help out. Pay was
not discussed. Glover had not worked for Ware before. Glover was on
the bed of a flatbed truck, moving hay bales from the truck bed onto the
conveyor of a mulching machine. As the truck started up a slope, Glover
lost his balance and fell off. The mulching machine ran over him.
Emergency personnel were called, but Glover did not survive the
accident.5 6
Glover's family filed for workers' compensation death benefits, but the
case was not pursued at the state board. The workers' compensation
carrier asked Ware to sign a statement that Glover was not his
employee, which Ware did. Glover's family went on to file the wrongful
death suit, and the defendants then asserted the exclusive remedy
provisions.57 In looking at the conflicting evidence-which included
Ware's signed statement for his insurance carrier that Glover was not
an employee-the court of appeals reversed the state court, simply
stating that the case presented genuine issues of fact for a jury to
decide.55 The court pointed out that the "situation is unusual, and
none of the reported cases directly apply,"5 9 despite the body of law
which seemed to support the trial court's findings.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

at
at
at
at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

759, 624 S.E.2d at 286.
761, 624 S.E.2d at 288.
759, 624 S.E.2d at 286.
760, 624 S.E.2d at 287.
759, 624 S.E.2d at 286.
761-62, 624 S.E.2d at 287-88.
761, 624 S.E.2d at 288.
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Failureto Cooperate with Medical Treatment

In Dallas v. Flying J, Inc.,"° the employee was injured and received
benefits. The employer, Flying J, wanted the employee to return to his
doctor at the Glynn Immediate Care ("GIC") clinic, and the employee
was ordered by the ALJ to call GIC and schedule an appointment within
fifteen days. He did not comply, and his benefits were suspended. He
sought reinstatement of his benefits, arguing that he called GIC several
times and tried to schedule an appointment, but the GIC would only
take walk-ins. In his view, he did everything possible to comply with
the ALJs order, but the clinic would not schedule an appointment.6'
The ALJ felt constrained to lift the suspension of benefits because the
employee "'perfectly complied with the letter'" of the order.62
The board's appellate division vacated the ALJ's reinstatement of
benefits, accepting the employer's argument that the employee failed to
cooperate with medical treatment.63 The Workers' Compensation Act
required the employee to submit himself to an examination by the
treating doctor at reasonable times, and if he refused, his benefits could
be suspended. 4 The employee argued that it was "'unreasonable to
expect him to sit in a room which may be cramped with twenty or more
sick patients awaiting his turn.' 65 The appellate division reversed the
AL's reinstatement, finding that the employee knew he could receive
treatment on a walk-in basis and that he should have gone to the clinic
for treatment. 66 The court of appeals affirmed the appellate division's
decision. 7
Superior Court's Jurisdiction

E.

In Sears v. Macon Water Authority, 8 the appeal dealt with an order
issued by the superior court, which limited future medical expenses for
a compensable condition.6 9 The court of appeals held that the superior
court exceeded its jurisdiction in adding the limiting language to its

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

279 Ga. App. 786, 632 S.E.2d 389 (2006).
Id. at 787-88, 632 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 788, 632 S.E.2d at 392.
Id. at 789, 632 S.E.2d at 392.
Id. at 791, 632 S.E.2d at 393; see O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(c) (2004).
Dallas, 279 Ga. App. at 790, 632 S.E.2d at 393.
Id. at 790-91, 632 S.E.2d at 393.
Id. at 791, 632 S.E.2d at 393.
276 Ga. App. 194, 622 S.E.2d 867 (2005).
Id. at 195, 622 S.E.2d at 869.
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order.7 ° In this case, the employee fell from a ladder and sustained
several injuries, including fractured bones. While in the hospital, he was
taken off a blood thinner he had been taking for his heart condition, and
about four days after the fall, he had a heart attack. The medical
evidence showed that the heart attack was caused by a combination of
the employee's pre-existing heart disease, physical stress from the fall,
fractured bones, pain, reduction of blood thinning medications, and the
chemical changes in his body that made his arteries more susceptible to
clotting.71
The ALJ found that the heart attack arose from the fall's aggravation
of the employee's pre-existing heart disease and ordered that related
medical expenses from the treatment be paid. The employer appealed,
but the appellate division affirmed the ALJ's finding. v2 When the
employer appealed to superior court, the court affirmed the appellate
division but added that the employer is "'not required to pay any future
medical expenses related to Claimant's heart condition."'7 v
The
employee appealed that portion of the superior court's order, and the
court of appeals agreed that the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction
by making a finding of fact regarding the compensability of all future
medical bills related to the employee's heart condition.74
F

Reimbursement of Benefits

In Trax-Fax, Inc. v. Hobba,75 the issue was whether O.C.G.A. section
34-9-245,76 which provides that claims for reimbursement of overpaid

70. Id.
71. Id. at 194-95, 622 S.E.2d at 868-69.
72. Id. at 195, 622 S.E.2d at 869.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 195-96, 622 S.E.2d at 869-70. The superior court may only affirm or reverse
as a matter of law, and it may sometimes give directions. Id. at 196, 622 S.E.2d at 869.
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-105(c) provides for the limited circumstances when the superior
court may set aside the board's decision:
(1) The [board] members acted without or in excess of their powers; (2) The
decision was procured by fraud; (3) The facts found by the [board] members do not
support the decision; (4) There is not sufficient competent evidence in the record
to warrant the [board] members making the decision; or (5) The decision is
contrary to law.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(c) (2004). In Atkinson v. Home Indemnity Co., the court of appeals
held that the superior court may not substitute itself as a fact-finding authority in lieu of
the board. 141 Ga. App. 687, 687, 234 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1977).
75. 277 Ga. App. 464, 627 S.E.2d 90 (2006).
76. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-245 (2004). The code section reads:
Should the board find that a claimant has received an overpayment of income
benefits from the employer, for any reason, the board shall have the authority to
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income benefits must be filed within two years from the date the
overpayment was made, applied to a case of overpayment that began in
the year prior to the statute's enactment.7' Hobba, an employee of
Trax-Fax, was also the president and sole shareholder of the company.
He was injured in a work accident on July 28, 1998 and was paid
temporary total disability benefits through April 24, 2002. Travelers,
Trax-Fax's carrier, found out that Hobba had actually returned to work
some time prior to April 24, 2002 and sought to have Hobba reimburse
all the benefits he had been paid.78
At a hearing, the ALJ found that Hobba had never been totally
economically disabled and that Travelers was entitled to full reimbursement of all benefits paid to Hobba. The ALJ also ordered Hobba to pay
attorney fees, litigation expenses, and a civil penalty, and referred the
case to the board's enforcement division. Hobba appealed, but the
appellate division affirmed the ALJ.79 He then appealed to superior
court, arguing that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-245 should have applied as a
statute of repose,8" thus only allowing recovery of overpayments made
in the two years prior to the request for reimbursement. The superior
court agreed with this argument and concluded that Travelers was only
entitled to reimbursement of benefits that were paid in the two years
preceding the date that it filed its reimbursement claim. The superior
court also reversed the board's award of attorney fees, the assessment
of the civil penalty, and the referral of the matter to the board's
8
enforcement division. '

order repayment on terms acceptable to the parties or within the discretion of the
board. No claim for reimbursement shall be allowed where the application for
reimbursement is filed more than two years from the date such overpayment was
made.

Id.
77. Trax-Fax, 277 Ga. App. at 466, 627 S.E.2d at 93.
78. Id. at 464-65, 627 S.E.2d at 92.
79. Id. at 465, 627 S.E.2d at 92-93.
80. The distinction between the statute of limitation and the statute of repose is that:
"A statute of limitation is a procedural rule limiting the time in which a party
may bring an action for a right which has already accrued. A statute of ultimate
repose delineates a time period in which a right may accrue. If the injury occurs
outside that period, it is not actionable." A statute of repose stands as an
unyielding barrier to a plaintiff's right of action. The statute of repose is absolute;
the bar of the statute of limitation is contingent.
Simmons v. Sonyika, 279 Ga. 378, 379, 614 S.E.2d 27, 29 (2005) (quoting Craven v.
Lowndes County Hosp. Auth., 263 Ga. 657, 660, 437 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1993)) (citations
omitted); see generally Trent Tube v. Hurston, 261 Ga. App. 525, 583 S.E.2d 198 (2003)
(discussing statute of limitations in workers' compensation reimbursement cases).
81. Trax-Fax, 277 Ga. App. at 465, 627 S.E.2d at 92-93.
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Travelers then appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that because
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-245 is a statute of limitations that Hobba failed to
raise as a defense at the hearing, the defense was waived. 2 In the
alternative, Travelers pointed out that O.C.G.A. section 34-9-245 was
enacted a year after Hobba's injury, and thus, even if it is a statute of
repose, it should not be retroactively applied." The court of appeals,
however, held that the superior court's interpretation of O.C.G.A. section
34-9-245 as a statute of repose was correct and that the statute could be
applied in this case even though the alleged injury occurred a year
before the statute's enactment.8 4 Thus, Hobba only had to reimburse
Travelers for the two years preceding the date on which Travelers
brought its reimbursement claim.8 But the court also held that the
superior court had no right to reverse the board's assessment of attorney
fees, the civil penalty, and the referral of the matter to the enforcement
division. 6 As a result, the board's decision on those issues was allowed
to stand.8"
G.

Subject Matter Jurisdictionto Determine Coverage

The insurer's defense that it properly cancelled an employer's coverage
is most often asserted after an employee files a claim. When the insurer
raises this defense after the employee has filed a claim, all parties are
likely to ask the state board to rule on the coverage issues because it is
convenient to have one hearing for the coverage and workers' compensation issues. It is also more economical and efficient to have the coverage
issue addressed by the state board rather than by the superior or state
courts. The state board is allowed to decide coverage issues that concern
the payment of benefits to an injured employee because the issue is
ancillary to an employee's claim. 8
In Builders Insurance Co. v. Ker-Wil Enterprises,Inc.,"s the employee,
Jacob Reeves, filed a claim with the state board against Ker-Wil
Enterprises, Inc. ("Ker-Wil") and Builders Insurance ("Builders"), the
insurer, for compensation of an injury he sustained under Ker-Wil's
employment.
Builders disputed the claim and denied coverage,

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
S.E.2d
89.

Id. at 466, 627 S.E.2d at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 471-72, 627 S.E.2d at 97-98.
Id. at 472, 627 S.E.2d at 98.
See Builders Ins. Group, Inc. v. Ker-Wil Enters., Inc., 274 Ga. App. 522, 525, 618
160, 163 (2005).
274 Ga. App. 522, 618 S.E.2d 160 (2005).
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contending that it had timely and properly cancelled Ker-Wil's policy.90
Builders filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and a motion for
summary judgment in Henry County Superior Court.91 Both pleadings
essentially sought a finding from the court that Builders properly and
timely cancelled the coverage for Ker-Wil.9 2 The employer then filed
an answer and a motion to dismiss, arguing that a declaratory judgment
was not appropriate in this case and that the coverage issue should have
been addressed by the state board when the employee's claim was heard.
The superior court granted Ker-Wil's motion to dismiss but did not rule
on Builders's motion for summary judgment.93
Builders appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that the superior
court erred in granting the employer's motion to dismiss and in not
ruling on Builders's motion for summary judgment.9 4 Builders also
argued that the state board did not have subject matter jurisdiction to
decide the coverage issue.95 However, the court of appeals agreed with
the superior court's handling of the case, pointing out that the purpose
of a declaratory judgment is "'to settle and afford relief from uncertainty
and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.'"96 Here, because Builders had denied coverage from the outset,
a declaratory judgment was not appropriate or available because
Builders was neither uncertain nor insecure with regard to its rights,
status, or legal relations.9"
Essentially, the court reasoned that
declaratory judgment could be used in a situation where the insurer was
not sure if it should provide coverage, but not in a case where the
insurer had already made the decision to deny coverage.9"
The court also stated that the failure to rule on the motion for
summary judgment was not error, and because there was no ruling,
there was nothing for the court of appeals to review.99 Builders's last
argument was that the state board had no subject matter jurisdiction to
resolve the coverage issue.' ° ° The court of appeals confirmed that
there was no Georgia case explicitly on point. 01°
Nonetheless, in

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 522, 618
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 523, 618
Id., 618 S.E.2d
Id.
Id. at 522, 618
Id. at 523, 618
Id.

S.E.2d at 161.

S.E.2d at 161-62 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1 (1982)).
at 162.
S.E.2d at 161.
S.E.2d at 162.
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accordance with the general rule,' °2 the court held that the board had
jurisdiction "to resolve workers' compensation insurance coverage issues
that bear
upon the payment of benefits to an injured employee claim103
ant."
H.

Change in Condition

°
In John W. Rooker & Associates v. Patterson,"
the court of appeals
affirmed the state board's latitude in determining when an employee has
actually returned to work for purposes of determining a change in
condition. 105 Patterson, a heavy equipment operator, suffered injuries
in 1996 that ultimately resulted in a spinal fusion. The employer
voluntarily accepted the claim, and Patterson's injuries were ultimately
deemed catastrophic under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200.1.106
Subsequently, however, the employer sought to reduce Patterson's disability
benefits from temporary total to temporary partial, based upon the
allegation that Patterson had returned to work as a maintenance worker
for an apartment complex. 107 The evidence showed that Patterson was
a close friend of the apartment manager of the complex where he was
alleged to have worked. The apartment manager used to baby-sit
Patterson's children when they were younger, and Patterson visited the
complex on a regular basis. Patterson occasionally assisted the manager
around the property by performing odd jobs, including replacing faucets,
changing doorknobs, checking the wiring on stoves, unstopping
refrigerator wiring, and picking up items from the store, but he had not
been paid for these jobs. There was evidence, however, that Patterson
was paid gas money for driving to various stores, ranging from $10 to
$50, totaling up to $100 over the course of the year. Both the employee
and the apartment manager testified that Patterson did not work for the
apartment complex, but rather simply helped out with small tasks when
the regular maintenance workers were not available.
The ALJ

102.
"The general rule appears to be that, when it is ancillary to the determination of
the employee's right, the Board has authority to pass upon a question relating to
the insurance policy, including fraud in procurement, mistake of the parties,
reformation of the policy, cancellation, existence or validity of an insurance
contract, coverage of the policy at the time of injury, and construction of extent of
coverage."
Id. (quoting 9 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law §§ 150.04 [11-[2]).
103. Id. at 525, 618 S.E.2d at 163.
104. 276 Ga. App. 410, 623 S.E.2d 258 (2005).
105. Id. at 410-11, 623 S.E.2d at 259-60.
106. Id. at 411, 623 S.E.2d at 260; see O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200.1 (2004 & Supp. 2006).
107. Rooker, 276 Ga. App. at 411, 623 S.E.2d at 260.
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determined that the employee had simply helped out by performing odd
jobs for a friend and that his activities did not constitute an actual
return to work.0 8
On appeal, the employer argued that the evidence before the board
demanded, as a matter of law, the conclusion that Patterson had
undergone a change in condition and that a reduction in benefits was
required.109 Specifically, the employer relied upon the court's previous
decisions in WAGA-T, Inc. v. Yang"0 and ABB Risk Management
Service v. Lord"' for the proposition that proof of the employee's
activities at the apartment complex demanded the conclusion that the
employee had returned to work." 2 The court of appeals observed that
in those cases, the state board had considered similar evidence and
determined that the employee had, in fact, returned to work."13 But
the court distinguished these cases, stating, "Our opinions in Yang and
Lord were grounded on the 'any evidence' standard of review; they do
not mandate the same result on similar facts.""' 4 Next, the employer
argued that evidence of suitable employment from a labor market survey
demanded the conclusion that the employee had undergone a change in
condition."' The court rejected this argument because there was no
evidence that any of these jobs were actually available to the employee
or that he knew about them."16 In determining whether a particular
employee's activities constitute an actual "return to work," the facts of
each particular case must be closely examined, with a focus on the
employee's ability to earn income." 7
In Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority ("MARTA") v.
Bridges,"8 the court of appeals once again strictly construed O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-104(a)(2) with regard to the reduction of benefits based upon
an employee's release to light-duty work." 9 After sustaining a compensable injury, Bridges's benefits were suspended based upon a normalduty work release from his authorized treating physician, Dr. Bernot.
Bridges then requested a hearing to challenge the suspension of benefits

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 413-14, 623 S.E.2d at 261-62.
Id. at 412, 623 S.E.2d at 261.
256 Ga. App. 224, 568 S.E.2d 58 (2002).
254 Ga. App. 88, 561 S.E.2d 225 (2002).
Rooker, 276 Ga. App. at 412, 623 S.E.2d at 261.
Id. at 412-13, 623 S.E.2d at 261.
Id. at 413, 623 S.E.2d at 261.
Id. at 414, 623 S.E.2d at 262.
Id.
See id. at 413, 623 S.E.2d at 261.
276 Ga. App. 220, 623 S.E.2d 1 (2005).
Id. at 224, 623 S.E.2d at 3.
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and to seek a change in physicians to Dr. Kingloff. After an evidentiary
hearing, the ALJ issued an award on November 1, 2002, finding that
Bridges's condition had not changed for the better, that he was entitled
to temporary total disability benefits retroactive to April 5, 2002 (the
date the benefits were originally suspended), and also granted a change
in physicians to Dr. Kingloff. On January 21, 2003, MARTA unilaterally
reduced Bridges's benefits under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a)(2) from
temporary total disability benefits to temporary partial disability
benefits based upon a WC-104 form that MARTA filed. The form was
based upon Dr. Bernot's conclusions about the claimant's condition in
February 2002, which was prior to the AU.'s decision. Following a
second evidentiary hearing, a different AJ issued an award on
December 10, 2003, finding that the reduction of benefits was improper
because MARTA had failed to prove compliance with120the mandatory
requirement of filing the WC-104 form with the board.
On appeal, the court held, "In order to avail itself of the opportunity
to unilaterally convert an employee from temporary total disability to
temporary partial disability, MARTA was required to strictly comply
with O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)(2)." 121 In this regard, MARTA's failure to
prove that the WC-104 form was filed with the board violated Board
Rule 104, which required that the form be filed with the board and sent
to the employee. 22 MARTA argued that the employee stipulated at
the hearing that the WC-104 existed. 123 The court relegated its
discussion of this argument to a footnote, holding that the stipulation
"[did] not fulfill the requirements of the statute." 24 In addition, the
court of appeals held that Dr. Bernot's medical report, upon which the
WC-104 was based, was no longer valid given the original hearing,
which rejected Dr. Bernot's opinion. 125 Similarly, the court rejected
MARTA's attempts to rely on another WC-104 that was issued in
126
November 2001 and was based upon the opinion of Dr. Dawkins.
The court noted:
Following his return to light duty status by Dr. Bernot, there was no
WC-104 filed by MARTA with the Board with a statement by Dr.
Kingloff, the authorized treating physician pursuant to Conner's award,

120. Id. at 221-22, 623 S.E.2d at 2.
121. Id. at 224, 623 S.E.2d at 3.
122. Id. at 223, 623 S.E.2d at 3 (citing Rules and Regulations of the State Bd. of
Workers' Compensation, Rule 104(a) (2003)).
123. Id. at 224 n.3, 623 S.E.2d at 4 n.3.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 224, 623 S.E.2d at 4.
126. Id.
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or Dr. Bernot that Bridges was able to return to light duty ....
MARTA's failure to show compliance with the statutory requirements
precludes its unilateral suspension of benefits.12 '
What is curious about the court's comments is that the first ALJ
award "established that Bridges had been capable only of sedentary
work since the 2001 accident."128 Presumably, therefore, at least one
of the res judicata effects of the first award was to establish that Bridges
was capable of at least some form of light-duty work. Nevertheless, the
court rejected MARTA's various efforts to reduce benefits under O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-104(a)(2) because of MARTA's failure to strictly follow the
129
notice requirements contained therein.
Since the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Maloney v. Gordon
County Farms,' the appellate courts have occasionally struggled with
what constitutes the proximate cause of an employee's reduced income
in attempting to find a change in condition.' 3 ' The court of appeals
addressed this issue again in Roberts v. The Jones Co. 32 Roberts
sustained a compensable injury to her right wrist while working at Flash
Foods, which voluntarily commenced workers' compensation benefits.
Roberts eventually returned to light-duty work with Flash Foods, but
her employment was subsequently terminated for reasons unrelated to
her on-the-job injury. Roberts then looked for work with other employers, eventually finding a job at Huddle House which paid less than her
previous job with Flash Foods.' 3
After beginning work at Huddle House, Roberts requested a hearing
seeking temporary total disability benefits for the period between her
termination at Flash Foods and the start of her job at Huddle
House.'
She also sought temporary partial disability benefits "based
on a change of economic condition for the worse" because her income was
less at Huddle House.'35
After an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ
determined that Roberts had undertaken a diligent but unsuccessful

127. Id. at 224-25, 623 S.E.2d at 4.
128. Id. at 222, 623 S.E.2d at 2.
129. Id. at 225, 623 S.E.2d at 4; see also City of Atlanta v. Sumlin, 258 Ga. App. 643,
646, 574 S.E.2d 827, 830 (2002) (requiring the employer's strict compliance with O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-104(a)(2) and Board Rule 104).
130. 265 Ga. 825, 462 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
131. See Padgett v. Waffle House, Inc., 269 Ga. 105, 498 S.E.2d 499 (1998); Harrell v.
City of Albany Police Dep't, 219 Ga. App. 810, 466 S.E.2d 682 (1996); L.C.P. Chems. v.
Strickland, 221 Ga. App. 742, 472 S.E.2d 471 (1996).
132. 277 Ga. App. 517, 627 S.E.2d 139 (2006).
133. Id. at 517-18, 627 S.E.2d at 139-40.
134. Id. at 518, 627 S.E.2d at 140.
135. Id.
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search for suitable employment following the termination of her
employment at Flash Foods and that she was therefore entitled to
temporary total disability benefits for this period of time. The AIJ
denied temporary partial disability benefits, however, finding that the
employee had failed to produce evidence that her lower earnings at
Huddle House were related to her compensable injury with Flash
Foods." 6
The court of appeals reversed, stating:
Where, as here, after a diligent job search the employee accepts lowerpaying work for continuing disability incident to a compensable injury
the need for temporary partial disability benefits is no less compelling
than the case for temporary total disability benefits under Maloney.
To hold otherwise would be to create a disincentive for motivated
workers to seek suitable employment after suffering a compensable
injury and would undermine the well-settled principle that the
Workers' Compensation Act be interpreted liberally for the protection
of both employers and employees.137
The court of appeals noted that the supreme court's decision in Maloney
overturned a number of prior decisions that imposed an additional
requirement upon change of condition claimants to show why they were
refused prospective employment.'3 8 In denying Roberts's claim for
temporary partial disability benefits, the ALJ concluded that Roberts
had failed to show a connection between her lower wages at Huddle
House and her compensable injury at Flash Foods.'39 Because the ALJ
imposed upon Roberts the requirement that she demonstrate that her
lower wages at Huddle House were a result of the compensable injury
she sustained at Flash Foods, the court of appeals concluded that the
ALJ "imposed on Roberts the additional burden of proof which Maloney
rejected." 4 ° As a result, the court reversed the AU's decision on
Roberts's entitlement to temporary partial disability benefits and
remanded the case for further proceedings.'
Obviously, the mere fact that one job pays less than another does not
mean that an employee's reduced income has been proximately caused
by restrictions from the compensable injury. Apparently, however, the

Id.
137. Id. at 519, 627 S.E.2d at 140 (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23 (2004); Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 287, 9 S.E.2d 84, 90 (1940)) (footnote omitted).
138. Id. at 518-19, 627 S.E.2d at 140 (citing Maloney, 265 Ga. at 827-28, 462 S.E.2d at
136.

608).
139. Id. at 519, 627 S.E.2d at 140.
140. Id.
141.

Id.
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court of appeals concluded that the evidence of this employee's diligent
but unsuccessful job search before finding work at Huddle House
demanded the conclusion that her lower wages there were proximately
caused by the compensable injury. To the extent this conclusion is based
on O.C.G.A. section 34-9-23,42 it would appear to be misplaced, as this
code section requires that the Workers' Compensation Act be liberally
construed "only for the purpose of bringing employers and employees
within the provisions of this chapter and to provide protection for
both." 43 Other than this one exception, the code section goes on to
require that "[tihe provisions of this chapter shall be
construed and
" 44
applied impartiallyto both employers and employees. '
The right of illegal aliens to workers' compensation benefits is an issue
that has surfaced at the appellate level several times recently. 145 In
Martines v. Worley & Sons Construction,46 the employee's status as an
illegal alien was a factor in determining change in condition. Martines
sustained a compensable injury to his left foot while in the employ of
Worley & Sons Construction, which voluntarily paid workers' compensation benefits. When Martines was eventually released to work with
restrictions as a result of the left foot injury, Worley & Sons offered
light-duty work as a delivery truck driver, a job within his physical
limitations. In order to return to the truck driving position, Martines
was asked to produce a valid driver's license and proof of legal citizenship. At that time, Martines revealed that he could not produce a
Georgia driver's license and could not obtain one because he was in the
country illegally.'47
After a subsequent evidentiary hearing, an ALJ concluded that the job
offered to Martines was not suitable because he did not possess the
driver's license required for the job.'4 8 Although affirmed by the
appellate division, the superior court reversed this finding, and the court
of appeals affirmed the superior court's reversal.4 9
The court of
appeals held, "We conclude that an injured worker's refusal to accept a
suitable job based on a legal inability to perform the job resulting from
the worker's voluntary conduct, rather than a lack of skill or physical

142. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23 (2004).
143. Id.
144.
145.

Id. (emphasis added).
See H. Michael Bagley, Daniel C. Kniffen & Katherine D. Dixon, Workers'
Compensation, 57 MERCER L. REV. 419, 430-34 (2005).

146. 278 Ga. App. 26, 628 S.E.2d 113 (2006).
147. Id. at 26, 628 S.E.2d at 114.
148. Id. at 26-27, 628 S.E.2d at 114.
149.

Id. at 27, 32, 628 S.E.2d at 114, 117.
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capacity, is not justified as a matter of law."15 In so holding, the court
relied upon the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling in City of Adel v.
Wise, ' 51 which established a two-pronged test to determine when
benefits are appropriately suspended on the basis of an offer of suitable
employment.'5 2 First, the state board must determine whether the
employment offered by the employer and refused by the employee is
suitable to the employee's capacity, which means whether the employee's
capacity or ability to perform the work is within his physical limitations
Second, if it is determined that the proffered
or restrictions. 153
employment is suitable to the capacity of the employee then the board
must determine whether the employee's refusal of the job is justified. 55 As the court further explained, however, the board's discretion
in determining whether a refusal of light-duty work is justified is not
without limits, and the refusal "'must relate, in some manner, to his
physical capacity or his ability to perform the job in order for his refusal
5
34-9-240. ' )15
to be justified within the meaning of O.C.G.A. [section]
In applying this standard, the court held that Martines's situation is
analogous to a person whose license1 56has been revoked or a person who
is in jail after conviction of a crime.
The court observed that its prior decision in Earth First Grading v.
5
Gutierrez17 did not require a different result. ' The court noted
that in Gutierrez, the court rejected the employer's argument that the
illegal immigrant employee in that case was precluded from receiving
temporary total disability benefits because the employee's illegal status
was analogous to incarceration.5 9 The court distinguished Gutierrez
by pointing out that the employee's illegal status in that case was not
the cause of the employee's inability to find work because his illegal
status was not discovered until after the period for which the employee
sought benefits, and the employee had performed work for the employer
despite his illegal status. 160 In contrast, the employee's illegal status
in Martines was the cause of the employee's inability to accept the

150.
151.
152.
S.E.2d
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 26, 628 S.E.2d at 114 (emphasis added).
261 Ga. 53, 401 S.E.2d 522 (1991).
Martines, 278 Ga. App. at 28, 628 S.E.2d at 115 (citing Wise, 261 Ga. at 54-55, 401
at 524).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting City of Adel, 261 Ga. at 55, 401 S.E.2d at 524).
Id. at 29, 628 S.E.2d at 116.
270 Ga. App. 328, 606 S.E.2d 332 (2004).
Martines, 278 Ga. App. at 29-30, 628 S.E.2d at 116.
Id. at 29, 628 S.E.2d at 116.
Id. at 29-30, 628 S.E.2d at 116.
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proffered employment because the employee revealed his illegal status
at the time he was denied employment as a truck driver as a result of
his "legal inability to obtain a Georgia driver's license."" 1
In addition, the court rejected Martines's argument that his illiteracy
prevented him from obtaining a license because the regulations of the
Department of Motor Vehicles allow for oral testing.16 2 The court also
noted that because Martines was not a resident of the state of Georgia,
he could not be issued a Georgia driver's license in any event, so the
question of administration of the test does not even arise.16 The court
also rejected Martines's argument that his refusal of employment was
justified because of the employer's failure to require employees to
complete an 1-9 form and concluded that this had no legal effect on
whether the employee's refusal of work was justified."M Finally, the
court rejected the argument that a physician's medical release, which
was issued two days after the employee refused the truck driving
position and stated that the employee was totally disabled, required a5
1
finding that the employee's refusal of employment was justified.
The court stated:
"[The statutory test focuses on the time that the lighter-duty employment is offered." Evidence that Martines was unable to work two days
later is not evidence that he was unable to work at the time the
position was offered, particularly when it is undisputed that he
reported to work on the date requested, made no complaints of pain,
and, as the AUJ found, returned home because "he was unable to
provide proper documentation." 6 '
I.

Change in Condition Versus New Accident
A highly unusual set of facts in Footstar,Inc. v.Stevens 6 7 caused
the court of appeals to once again elaborate on the differences between
a change in condition and a new accident in determining the liability of
multiple workers' compensation carriers.'68 Stevens was originally
injured on November 8, 1999, while working as the manager of a K-Mart
store shoe department that was operated by Footstar. At that time,
Footstar's workers' compensation coverage was provided by Travelers

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 30, 628 S.E.2d at 116.
Id.
Id.
Id., 628 S.E.2d 116-17.
Id. at 31, 628 S.E.2d at 117.
Id. (citation omitted).
275 Ga. App. 329, 620 S.E.2d 588 (2005).
Id. at 333, 620 S.E.2d at 590.
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Insurance, which voluntarily accepted Stevens's head, neck, and
shoulder injuries. But, because Stevens continued working, she received
only medical benefits for treatment of her injuries. On January 1, 2001,
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company became Footstar's workers'
compensation carrier.'69
Although Stevens continued to suffer from problems with her head,
neck, and shoulder, she continued to work, using sick leave and vacation
time because she was unable to work a full eight-hour work day. She
persuaded her doctor to allow her to continue working so she could
support her two children. 70
In August 2001, however, Travelers
requested a hearing to determine whether it remained responsible for
payment of the employee's medical treatment, or whether Liberty
Mutual should be responsible on the basis that she had a new injury
during Liberty Mutual's coverage. After an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ
concluded that Travelers remained responsible for payment of Stevens's
continuing medical expenses and that she had not sustained a new
injury or new accident under Liberty Mutual's coverage. 7 '
Approximately one month after the ALJ's December 18, 2001 award,
Stevens stopped working because of her injuries. Travelers appealed the
ALJ's award to the state board's appellate division, which ultimately
affirmed the findings on August 7, 2002. Although Footstar itself had
commenced payment of weekly indemnity benefits to the employee,
neither Travelers nor Liberty Mutual issued payment of benefits.
Ultimately, Stevens requested a hearing before the state board to
determine whether she was entitled to income benefits, and if so, which
insurance carrier was responsible. At the second hearing, the ALJ found
that because no income benefits had previously been paid to Stevens by
Travelers, a fictional new accident date had to be established as
Stevens's date of disability. The ALJ selected January 5, 2002, the date
Stevens left work, as the fictional new accident date. This meant that
Liberty Mutual, the insurance
carrier on that date, was liable for any
172
benefits owed to Stevens.

Liberty Mutual appealed to the appellate division, which reversed the
ALJ's finding that a new injury had occurred on January 5, 2002.
Travelers appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the appellate
division's reversal of the ALJ. 17' The court of appeals affirmed the

169. Id. at
170. Id. at
171. Id. at
172. Id. at
173. Id. at

330-31, 620 S.E.2d at 589.
330, 620 S.E.2d at 589.
331, 620 S.E.2d at 589.
331-32, 620 S.E.2d at 589-90.
332, 620 S.E.2d at 590.
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superior court's affirmance. 11 4 The court also distinguished a previous
line of cases which held that no change in condition can occur if income
benefits have not previously been paid. 175 The court stated that those
cases are distinguishable because all involved the voluntary payment of
benefits by the employer, as opposed to a case, as with Ms. Stevens, in
176
which compensability had been established by a previous award.
The court pointed out that the statutory definition of a "change in
condition" in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104 makes no reference to what type
of compensation must have been awarded, only that the "'wage-earning
capacity, physical condition, or status
of the employee ... was last
' 177
established by award or otherwise.
In Oconee Area Home Care Services, Inc. v. Burton,17 another case
dealing with the subject of change in condition versus new accident, the
court of appeals concluded that the evidence justified the board's
conclusion that the employee had sustained a change in condition as
opposed to a new accident. 179 Burton was originally injured on July
16, 2003, at which time Healthcare Mutual provided workers' compensation coverage to Burton's employer. Coverage changed to Southeast U.S.
Captive effective August 1, 2003, and although Burton returned to work
on August 4, 2003, he subsequently left work again on August 26,
2003.180

At a hearing to determine whether Healthcare Mutual or Southeast
U.S. Captive should be responsible for workers' compensation benefits
after he went out of work on August 26, 2003, Burton testified that his
inability to continue working was due to the first injury, and that he did
not suffer a new accident of any kind. Despite what the ALJ described
as certain inconsistencies in Burton's testimony, the ALJ found his
testimony, which was partially corroborated by a supervisor, to be
credible. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the employee's disability
was the result of a change in condition and not a new injury.'
The
court of appeals held that even though this conclusion was contradicted
by certain medical testimony and Burton's inconsistent statements, there

174. Id. at 334, 620 S.E.2d at 591.
175. Id.; see Smith v. Mr. Sweeper Stores, Inc., 247 Ga. App. 726, 544 S.E.2d 758
(2001); Wier v. Skyline Messenger Serv., 203 Ga. App. 673, 417 S.E.2d 693 (1992);
Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Babyak, 186 Ga. App. 339, 367 S.E.2d 567 (1988).
176. Footstar, 275 Ga. App. at 334, 620 S.E.2d at 591.
177. Id. at 333, 620 S.E.2d at 591 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)(1)).
178. 275 Ga. App. 784, 621 S.E.2d 859 (2005).
179. Id. at 786, 621 S.E.2d at 861-62.
180. Id. at 784, 621 S.E.2d at 860.
181. Id. at 786, 621 S.E.2d at 861.
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was nevertheless sufficient evidence in the record to support the ALJ's
conclusion that a change in condition had occurred.'82
J.

ContinuousEmployment

In Ray Bell Construction Co. v. King,183 the court of appeals continued its application of the continuous employment doctrine as a basis for
awarding workers' compensation benefits when the employee was not
clearly engaged in employment-related activities. In this case, Howard
was employed by Ray Bell Construction Company as a construction
superintendent on a job site in Butts County. Ray Bell Construction
provided Howard with company housing in Fayetteville, as well as the
use of a company owned truck for both work and personal use. Howard
had been out of work for a week recovering from knee surgery when, on
a Sunday, he drove the company owned truck from Fayetteville to Alamo
to deliver family furniture to a storage shed on property he owned. On
his return trip, he suffered fatal injuries in a motor vehicle accident in
Monroe County, Georgia, which is adjacent to Butts County. At the time
of the accident, Howard was carrying Ray Bell tools in his truck and was
returning either to his company-provided housing in Fayetteville or to
84
his job site in Butts County."
The court of appeals affirmed the state board's determination that
Howard was in continuous employment at the time of his fatal injuries,
and therefore, death benefits were payable under the Workers' Compensation Act. 85 The court stated, "Here, Howard was in continuous
employment in that he was 'required by [his] employment to lodge and
the necessity of being
work within an area geographically limited by
' 186
available for work on the employer's job site."
The court held that "some evidence supported the Board's implicit
finding that ... [Howard's] personal mission had ended at the time of
the accident."8i 7 The court noted that the proximity of the site of the
accident, in a county adjacent to where Howard was required by his
employer to lodge and work, made it clear that he had sufficiently
returned from any deviation from his employment and was in the
"general geographic area" required by his continuous employment. 188

182. Id.
183. 277 Ga. App. 144, 625 S.E.2d 541 (2006), cert. granted.
184. Id. at 145, 625 S.E.2d at 542.
185. Id. at 146, 625 S.E.2d at 542.
186. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Ga. Power Co., 128 Ga. App. 352, 353-54, 196 S.E.2d 693,
694 (1973)) (brackets in original).
187. Id. at 148, 625 S.E.2d at 544.
188. Id.
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The court acknowledged that the mere act of an employee on a personal
mission turning around to return toward the employee's assigned
geographic area does not, by itself, establish that the employee has
resumed employment activities." 9 Nonetheless, the court affirmed the
board's decision, stating that "[wie will not substitute our judgment for
that of the Board as to the precise bounds of the general Fayetteville/Jackson geographic area to which Howard was assigned." 9 °

189.
190.

Id. at 147, 625 S.E.2d at 543.
Id. at 148, 625 S.E.2d at 544.

